

## WAHABISM: PADRI MOVEMENT IN MINANGKABAU TO THE ISLAMIC DEFENDER ORGANIZATION IN INDONESIA

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### ABSTRACT

The purpose of the study was to identify the foundation and strategy of Padri religious movements in Minangkabau in the 19<sup>th</sup> mid century and the religious movement of the Islamic Defenders Organization or *Fron Pembela Islam* (FPI) in Indonesia in early 21<sup>st</sup> century. Phenomenology and Social constructivism approaches were used where the researcher tried to understand the world around and developed meanings in any particular point on certain object. The research finding showed that both the Padri movement and the Islamic Defenders Organization have the same foundation in the Islamic movement, and carried out the mission through a conservative approach. The movement was begun in the form of religious and social perspectives which had the same ultimate goal that empowered community life and political institutions. The Padri movement was led by Peto Syarif, a Moroccan immigrant which is known as *Tuanku Imam Bonjol*. Meanwhile, the movement of Islamic Defenders Organization was a purification movement of Islamic law led by a descendant of Yemeni migrants who came to Indonesia in 1935. From Perspectives of *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution, Wahabi ideology that accumulated through Frugal Defenders of Islam was seen as a potentially damaging community organization of Islam and unity on ideology of Republic of Indonesia which is well-known as *Pancasila* as the foundation of the highest constitution in the life of nation and society in Indonesia. The rise of radical acts by the Islamic Defenders Organization reflects the structure of religious life in the public sphere which is worse than in the new era. Finally, the Islamic Defenders Organization personifies their leaders as *Imam* and the Qur'an. For them, an Imam is the Qur'an which is called as silent Imam. The interference with Imam means to disturb the Qur'an, and the followers would rise up to defend without reservation.

**Keywords:** Minangkabau, Radical Islam, Padri movement, the Islamic Defenders Organization or *Fron Pembela Islam* (FPI).

## INTRODUCTION:

There are similarities between the movement of purification implementation of Islamic law in early 21<sup>st</sup> century committed by Islamist groups organized in mass organizations (society organization) of Islam which calls itself as Islamic Defenders Front, Jamaah Salafi / Wahhabi, Hizbut-Tahrir, Jama'ah Tabligh, Laskar Jihad, Jamaat Al Muslims (Jamus), and the other with a purification movement implementation of Islamic law committed by Padri in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century in the highlands of central Sumatra island, commonly known as Minangkabau. Leaders of both these religious movements at different times wear the same white turban, the style of dress of the mullahs like in the Middle East. Leaders of the two movements are both derived from the outside, the Padris led by a migrant Moroccan named Peto Syarif later known as Tuanku Imam Bonjol who has long been settled in Bonjol, so that the paramilitary Jihad in 21<sup>st</sup> century such as the Islamic Defenders Organization or *Fron Pembela Islam* (FPI) also led by the son of a migrant of South Yemen, Habib Risyiq who came to Indonesia in 1935 (Azra, 2004); (A'la, 2008). If the Padri movement was aimed at organized society in governance of Minangkabau region, in the early of 21<sup>st</sup> century, this religious movement occurs in people who are in the frame of Indonesia's National unity governments.

Both act radically in solving various problems of people who are not in accordance with Islamic law. According to (Elira, 2004); (Damayanti, Thayibi, Gardhiani, & Limy, 2012), radical Islam understands which want to do social and political change and replace it with Islamic law. Then, from the study of (Dobbin, 2008) on economic changes in Minangkabau is as a factor in the emergence of the Padri movement from 1784 to 1830. It can be explained that every movement made by radical is not just a mission to participate in solving various problems of the nation, but it also has economic mission and politics in disguise. The same view was also expressed by (Mubarak, 2015) that the reversed religious missions also accompany economic and political missions. Such as Padri movement in Minangkabau, it is at an early stage aims to purify the implementation of Islamic law for public life behavior seen already far away, but in the end it also aims to participate in the customary density Council of Nagari (district) or nagari government council (Azra, 2006). Then, it is also in line with the results of (Dobbin, 2008) that the Padri movement in the subsequent development of economics also aims to take control on coffee commodity trading center that thrives in the highlands of Agam. Along with the economic slowdown in kingdom of Pagarruyung which was initially dependent on the gold trade and pepper, the economic power shifts to the coffee commodity centralized in Agam has been a struggle for influence between the Ulama community with the consuetude community (Zed, 2011). The ulama want to control the coffee trade traffic between the mainland region (darek) of Minangkabau with Dutch merchants who concentrate in the important ports in Muara Padang, Pariaman, and Tiku. Then, the movement of Ulama, commonly called Padri, where its influence had largely spread out for more extensive rather than the influence of the Consuetude Community. Around the region wanted to participate in the government political institutions of the nagari (district) which is also called the Council of Consuetude Deliberation (Abdullah, 1966).

## LITERATURE REVIEW:

A historical phenomenon that occurred in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century in Minangkabau has returned through the process of reincarnation in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. If that happened in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, religious movements of Padris in the end was not only dealing with the government of Nagari but also face the Dutch colonial government that defeating the Consuetude Community people for the sake of political and economic interests of Dutch colonialism. Then, the religious movements at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century against the government, which incidentally is the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) from among the nation itself (Azra, 2006).

Coinciding with the presence of the reforms era, after the fall of the Soeharto regime, Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as the first President of the reform era that has given opportunity to the Islamic groups who are not satisfied with the political pressure of the new order. It manifests itself in various forms of religious movements and performed with various symbols, packaging, and ideology respectively. Indonesian political scene enlivened by the rise of Islamic parties with different logos and also accompany the splendor of the missionary movement, fronts, and the camps seemed to appear suddenly and enlarged and very phenomenal. As noted above, people suddenly know and hear names like Jamaat-Salafi / Wahabi, Hizbut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat, Laskar Jihad, Jamat Al Muslims (Jamus), and the Islamic Defenders Organization or *Fron Pembela Islam* (FPI). The interesting point to note here, is that their performance often appears even more Islamic, more humility and more committed to Islam than the group that emerged and large early as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah which ironically often seems slack in holding matters of principle such as this by granting the raising of Liberal Islam and the Ahmadiyah in our country. The political situation of President Gusdur

before the issue of the riots in Ambon, Poso, and Tertate which nearly dragged the two faiths: Islam and Christianity have pushed Islamist group Jihad increasingly showing its existence to come to compete in the Civil War (Turmudi & Sihbudi, 2005); (Rahmat, 2005); (Mubarak, 2015); (Hashim, 2016).

In the next journey, issues of Islam jihad have shifted towards Islamic movement of Jemaah Islamiyah and transnational Islamic movement called ISIS. Civil society was also involved to respond to the ISIS phenomenon. The phenomenon of radical Islamic movements from various groups and ISIS issues has become a hot national debate among scholars or intellectuals of Islam, both institutionally and personally. Indonesian civil societies view the behavior of Muslim organizations and ISIS far away from Islamic rule. (Galamas, 2015) argued that ISIS is more dangerous than radical groups ever. The birth of a radical Islamic group in Indonesia after the reform has also been polemical and hot national debates, between which the view that the act is considered too radical affected by Wahabi.

Basically, there have been many studies done about radicalism and Islam, as a study conducted by (Van Bruinessen, 2002); (Rahmat, 2005); (Turmudi & Sihbudi, 2005); (Umam, 2006); (Zaki, 2008), which discusses public attitudes about the pros and cons of Islamic radical. Likewise as (Fanani, 2013); (Azra, 2013); and (Maarif, 2013) respectively in the same journal examines the phenomenon of radicalism among youth and sociological reflection on the phenomenon of radicalism of young Muslims in Indonesia after the new order era. There are also studies focused on religion, theorists, and the role of the country. Some of the studies that have been conducted by academics and leaders of Islam and radical Islam, in general, can be argued that the study gives more attention to the process of radicalization and the consequences of radicalism. In this approach, determining the factors that cause individuals or groups act radically and verses of the Qur'an which is a cornerstone principle an act radically. Their views on belief, educational background, social and economic conditions are the main factors that make up the process of radicalization. Besides, radical action is often viewed as a rational choice for a group of people. Involving the mobilization of resources and political opportunities is framed with a specific framework, such as religion. A study of radicalism has a tendency to give more weight to the relationship between religious radicalism. Radical action always looks for its roots in the religious dimension. Radicalism among Muslim is always supposed to be associated with the ideology of jihadist. Radicalism is seen in a constitutive dimension at most fundamental aspects of human life as a religious belief. This view was causing difficulties to overcome. Confidence is a dimension of human life that is very difficult to intervene. Radicalism in the social dimension which can only be reduced and counter reacted with other social phenomena, namely the anti-radicalism. The response of religious leaders above is an expression of counter radicalism. Wide Attention by both government and society about radicalism, reflecting that radicalism is a serious problem. In the context of radicalism actors, the growing discourse is understood as a group of people who most educated of pesantren education. As a result, there is a view among public who meant that the boarding school is a place of education for potential terrorists. The issue of radicalism linking it to boarding school has made public opinion against the pesantren to be bad. On the other hand, the massive government action on Islamic radical groups that can worsen the image of the anti-government against Islam. Not only that, even other issues have been spawned such as Indonesia is American stooges who want to destroy the political power of Muslims in the eastern parts of the world. The charge stating the involvement of radical Islamic boarding schools as a network is not only in the realm of discourse in the media.

Countries also respond to the situation in the form of the need for the strict supervision of the existence of schools in the community. But the state response was groundless because, according to data from the Ministry of Religious Affairs in the 2000s, there are pesantren indicated as radical, ten years later increased to 300 schools indicated as radical. Therefore, the government through the Indonesian Vice President Muhammad Yusuf Kalla during the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono gave statement that the activity of schools spread across the country will be closely watched. According to some acts of terror among the Bali bombing did not rule out the possibility, the actors is students of boarding school were spread across the country. From the above views, it can be concluded that few studies that look at the relationship between the root causes of radical with Wahabism in Indonesia.

The discussion is developed as the relation of boarding school with radicalism. In this view, the pesantren education pattern is developed in Java is seen as an good initiative imported from the Middle East influenced by the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Bana and others who were suspected to be the cause of the proliferation of radicalism in Indonesia. Based on this background, the researchers were interested in studying about jihad and radicalism and correlation between Wahabi with Islamic radical and Wahabi influence on the growth of various radical movements in Indonesia. History has recorded that the relation between the Wahabi religious, radicalism has taken place in this Nusantara in the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century in Minangkabau. Is the radical movements that

occur today also has a strong relationship with the Wahabi? This research is expected to reveal similarities between Padri radicalism with radicalism era of reform and country views about radicalism. Then also revealed Wahabi relations with the Padri movement and radical Islamic groups today. The study will also reveal whether the schools have widened the fortress Wahabi in Indonesia.

#### **METHODOLOGY:**

This study used phenomenology constructivism approach developed by (Crotty, 1998); (Lincoln & Guba, 1985); and (Schwandt, 2007). Social constructivism presents the assumption that individuals are always trying to understand the world around where they live and they develop meaning in any particular point on the certain object. Then the researchers tried phenomenological approach to explore and capture the characters' views with regard to understanding about wahabi and radical Islam in Indonesia through the interviews, references provided in the form of documentation in the library, as well as journal articles published online and other social media. The views of community leaders that are capable of explaining Islam are identified and analyzed to obtain primary data and secondary used to reconstruct phenomenon which occurred on Wahabi and radical Islamic movements in Indonesia.

While the subject of study and the source in this study were (1) scientific works or writings of religious leaders from various cross-ideology, (2) the articles of university academics who publish in journals of national and international printed and on line, (3) Interviews with religious leaders and policy makers in this country, (4) the experiences of the actors of conflict religion presented through printed and online media as well as other social media.

#### **FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION:**

##### **Wahabi ideology or stream?**

Today we often hear the term of understanding (-isms) and ideology, the meaning understood by (Mubarak, 2008); (Rubaidi, 2014) and (Munawar, 2015) more connotes a line of thought that adheres to certain principles, not organized and has no central leader, although he has become a central figure in the familiar figure. Further explained that usually the followers of a particular understanding are critical ones, like to think, open and welcoming the dialogue, though it is not the case always. Meanwhile, the word of “-isms”, put more pressure on an understanding that is organized, there was the chairman, board and members, have certain rules and usually members can only blindly follow and affirm all that is said leaders without reserve. The followers of a particular school are usually the ones who have doctrine their mind, not like dialog, all-dogmatic, anti-criticism and tend to feel the most correct. From the second term, it can be explained that the word ‘understand’ is more directed to the static nature, an idea that is still in the framework and understanding for adherents. While the meaning of the word of ideology is more dynamic in nature in the form of understanding which is implemented in the form of behavior and action. For this study, researchers prefer the meaning of both the understanding and ideology, but for the importance of this study is to understand the meaning of the word sect found by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (1703-1792) is more familiar in Indonesia. This sect got into Indonesia under three Minangkabau who backed Hajj from Makkah that led to the birth of the Padri movement in Minangkabau (Azra, 2004).

In its development in Indonesia, Wahabi demanded a change in the enforcement of shari'ah by violence or coercion by a group that is unwilling to accept this view understood by way of radical change (Azra & Al-Jauhari, 1996); (Delong-Bas, 2008). Then the ones who impose their will on other groups were also conducted with the path of jihad. Da'wah and jihad is obligatory for Muslims. With the two methods outlined by Allah, the Muslims could achieve glory. Jihad is an attempt to reach safety. It is the guidance of Allah leads man to go to heaven (Hasan, 2008).

##### **The Wahabi and Salafi:**

Various studies and the views of experts and historians thought the idea was rooted in the teachings of Salafi Wahabi or Wahhabism. These schools encourage Muslims to return to the Qur'an and Sunnah, cleanse Muslims from misleading of *heresy* and *superstition*. Wahhabism ideology was built by Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792), a scholar from Najd, in the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula. Hence the term of Salafism or ideology of Salafi often synonymous with "Wahhabism", although the followers of Salafism itself reject this view, because they consider the term "Wahhabism" connotes harassing, and Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab repudiated establishing this new mazhab, and not also regards him as such. Salafis also considered adopting or leaning towards thinking Taymiyyah, scholars ahead of Abd al-Wahhab in promoting Puritanism. Therefore, the Salafi da'wah activists generally put a high respect to Ibn Taymiyah. Although some Egyptian Ulama in

19<sup>th</sup> century, Muhammad Abduh, Jamal al Afgani and Rashid Rida are known as Puritanism activists, but some Salafis rejected their thinking, because it is considered a rational Islamic reform groups and receive "modernism". The followers of Salafi also identify themselves as a group of Ahlus Sunnah WA al-Jama'ah, caused by their consistency in adhering to the Quran and Sunnah and united on it.

**Wahabi and Padri movement in Minangkabau:**

Padri radical movement inspired by the social conditions of a society that they see far deviated from the implementation of Islamic law, particularly concerning the behavior of Consuetude Community as a local leader in Minangkabau (Abd Ala, 2008). This violence which was done by Padri through a purification movement against the implementation of Islamic law by (Galtung, 2002) is the structural violence to marginalize people who are not willing to follow their ideology and also impose direct and cultural violence. Direct violence committed by Padri occurred in 1809 against the royal family and their superiors. In 1815, the same event occurred again led by Tuanku Lintau, Padris massacred the royal family of Pagaruyung (Radjab, 1964).

This movement initially occurred in Luhak Agam led by Tuanku Nan Renceh. Luhak Agam as one of Luhak Nan Tigo high plateau region fertile island of Central Sumatra, at the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century which was famous as regional suppliers of coffee commodity traded by local merchants through the way of the steep valley of Anai and continues towards Muara Padang (Graves, 2007); (Zed, 2011).

Minang as the center of political upheaval of Padri, according to Tambo Alam, Minangkabau consists of two areas, land area (Darek) called Luhak Nan Tigo consisted of Luhak Tanah Datar, Luhak Agam, and Luhak 50 Koto and neighborhood Rantau Coastal along a narrow lowland the west coast of Sumatra (Zed, 2011). Ethnic Minangkabau who inhabit the two regions at the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century split the two major groups of Muslims who still cling to the traditional long tradition commonly called Consuetude Community (the prince), and the Muslims who wanted to purify the implementation of Islamic law, commonly called the Padri. The birth of the two communities of this stems from the inclusion of Wahabi for Minangkabau through the return of three pilgrims from Makah in 1803 (Azra, 2013). Three figures pilgrimage to the holy land of the Minangkabau concurrently Mecca being under control of Wahabis. Therefore, according to (A'la, 2008); (Azra, 2004); (Azra, 2013); (Dobbin, 2008) is quite reasonable if they; Haji Miskin, Haji Sumanik, and Haji Piobang were thought to be influenced by Wahabi ideology.

The same view was also expressed by (Khatib, 1991); (Jahroni, 2007); (Haeda Nasir, 2008); (Kurniawan, 2013) that the interaction between Wahabi ideology with the Indonesian people began to be identified at the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Minangkabau with the returning of three leaders from Makah. Wahabi ideology inspired Ulama of West Sumatran known as the next wave of the Padri led by Tuanku Imam Bonjol. Next, in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the influence of Wahhabi ideology massively entered Indonesia through the role of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII), founded by Muhammad Natsir. Through the financial support of Saudi Arabia, the agency sends many students to the Middle East to study Islam (Jahroni, 2007); (Muzakki, 2014).

Wahhabi movement or commonly known as the Salafi movement is a movement based in Saudi Arabia, was born and flourished there since the 18<sup>th</sup> century. A characteristic of this ideology was invited to return to Islam in accordance with al-Salaf al-Salih, al-Quran, the Sunnah of the Prophet, his companions and the teachings of previous great Ulamas. For many authors, (Kovacs, 2014) and (Aswar, 2016) state that the term Wahabi was used to describe the thoughts of salafi which were in Saudi because the use of the word is also used by many Salafi movement apart from Arabia as the Islamic reform movement brought by Muhammad Abduh (1849) and Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1839-1897). Meanwhile, salafi in Saudi Arabia started thinking to bring back Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. The word of Wahabi is commonly used to express the thought which is carried out by followers of Abdul Wahhab despite the followers actually do not like being called a Wahhabiyyun or followers of the Wahhabi movement.

Returning to the role of three-Haji and supported by Tuanku Nan Renceh and Padri accepted jihad against other Muslims who do not follow their doctrine. As a result, civil war was happened, Consuetude Community went to the wall and then sent 14 Consuetude Community leaders to request assistance to the Netherlands and through meetings of Simawang, February 21, 1921, the Dutch colonial did intervention and the Padri war was ended in late 1830s. Bukit Marapalam 1933 agreement was signed between the Consuetude Community and Ulama community which was an important moment that has been a silent witness to the uncompromising attitude of the two communities. An attitude that has determined upon agreement of both the mutual acceptance and respect both the order of values: traditional and modern Islam values. Hence, this was the origin of principle of combination of the two foundations of the life of the Minangkabau called "Consuetude is shaped by religion (*Adat basandi syarak*), Religion is shaped by Al-Quran(*syarak basandi Kitabullah*); Consuetude tells, Religion uses (*Adat mengato syaraq mamakai*)". This means that traditional values that need to be maintained by the

community should be values based on Islamic doctrine in accordance with the Qur'an and hadith Rasullullah. Bukit Marapalam agreement in 1833 has become a deadline for the civil war between Padri with Consuetude Community and turned into Minangkabau war against Dutch colonialism. Minangkabau people's resistance was ended in 1837 after the Dutch successfully captured the last fort of Padri in Bukit Tajadi in Bonjol.

The civil war between the two communities of this Minangkabau in 1833 turned into Minangkabau people's resistance against Dutch colonialism has spawned debate and differing views among historians and academics (Khatib, 1991); (Dobbin, 2008); (Santi, Sukardi, & Ermarita, 2016). There is a view of radical Padri movement in Minangkabau end without a clear purpose since the stronger influence of Dutch colonialism in Minangkabau with coffee cultivation system until 1908 (Zed, 2011). But also there is an opinion, Padri movement has spawned a model of the spread of Islam that compromise occurs in matrilineal Minangkabau society that upholds the values and democratic egalitarian. Both of these values have managed to reduce conflict in society through Bukit Marapalam agreement 1833 (1964). Radical movements and the ambiguous attitude of the Padri is based on Wahabi was successfully suppressed by the attitude of mutual acceptance and respect between the two communities. Padri with Wahabi which they profess, actually also is an integral part of the Consuetude Community. They are also part of the elite Minangkabau, part of the consuetude children's niece. The difference occurs because of the differences in addressing the problems that occur in society. As stated by (Abdullah, 1966) that religion conflict in Minangkabau can be considered as one of the three models of the spread of Islam in the archipelago. According to (Boechari, 1971) states that the process of Islamization in the archipelago, there are three patterns of Islamization; *First*, the pattern of Islamization in Aceh; *second*, the pattern of Islamization in Minangkabau; and third, the pattern of Islamization in Java. Confirmed by (Boechari, 1971), Islam was spread by traders from Gujarat, India among the public and put the Ulama as an influential public figures. Then the Ulama announced themselves as not only as a religious leader but in the subsequent development also managed to form a political force with the birth of the Islamic kingdom in the archipelago (Boechari, 1971); (Hasymy, 1989); (Azra, 2004).

State of Aceh is a model of the spread of Islam as (Effendi, 2012); (Maarif, 2009) states that Islam was moving from the public to the Palace. This means that in Aceh, the political power of government which is reflected through the palace was founded by Ulama. This process spawned foundations of their society respectful attitude towards the Ulama. The people of Aceh are very obedient and subservient to the Ulama and Sultan. The palace is symbolic power of the Ulama, the people are obedient to the Palace but not necessarily obedient. Power do not lies in the hands of the Sultan but the Ulama, though the palace was occupied by the Dutch, but the fight against the Dutch persists because it actually means people's power in the hands of the Ulama (Hasymy, 1989).

Model spread of Islam next is happening on the island of Java, a process that occurs after the fall of Majapahit 1478 M by experts caused by the growing political power of Islam along the northern coast of the island of Java, and finally as one political force to speed the process of the collapse of the Majapahit empire, The ulama on the northern coast of Java island have succeeded in building a kingdom of Demak as the first Islamic kingdom in the archipelago (Kartodirdjo, 1987). Political institutions of this kingdom eventually became the instrument that drives Islam was moved from the Palace to the public to make the process of Islamisation. The consequences of this model of the spread of Islam, making the people very docile and obedient to the ruler of the palace or also the Ulama. For the Javanese, the palace is the symbol of the supremacy of the power of Islam, people obedient and submissive to the commands of Ulama as well as the king. Resistance against Dutch colonialism was continued without interruption until the last drop of blood, as long as they think the Palace is still subject to and controlled by the Dutch. However, if the court had first surrendered to the Dutch, then the strength of the community is also not surrendered. Unlike in Aceh, even if the court had surrendered to the Dutch, but people will still move to take the fight led by the Ulama, and the resistance of the people of Aceh have ended after the Dutch issue the moment the war with a system of forts stelsel on the advice Snouck Hurgronje, an architect of political Islam Indies who understand cells of the Acehnese people (Effendi, 2012).

While the process of Islamisation in Minangkabau, conducted by the Ulama radically ended with a compromise through Bukit Marapalam agreement in 1833. Compromise resulted blended Islamic values and custom value through "Consuetude is shaped by religion (*Adat basandi syarak*), Religion is shaped by Al-Quran(*syarak basandi Kitabullah*).

Besides the social, cultural and political issues intertwined causal factors Conflict of Consuetude Community and Padri, it is also caused by the economic problems as an important aspect that cannot be ignored. Luhak Tanah Datar known as gold and pepper producer country in the 17<sup>th</sup> century was under control of Pagaruyung Kingdom through the role of the king. Meanwhile, the Consuetude Community run out of natural resources and shifted to coffee as a commodity export trade in the 19th century. Luhak Agam, which is fertile plateau, was

famous as the largest coffee producer in Minangkabau region. This area had been fought over influence by both communities. Apart from the socio-political and religious factors, a geographical factor in the form of control over Luhak Agam was also used as one of the main capitals for the Padri movement to strengthen their interest in the economic field. For example, through the controlling over Luhak Agam and Tanah Datar, Padri community can access and control of a large number of coffee plants, surplus crops of rice, fruits, and vegetables from a number of markets they conquered (Dobbin, 2008). The economic factor was clearly evident when Padri expanded powers to the north. According to historian Gusti Asnan as reported by *Tempo*, when their forces in the south began to be squeezed as a result of occupation of the Netherlands, they headed to Pasaman and Tapanuli because this area has a wealth of very high base. In addition, by taking control of the area, the Padris can resume trade relations with the outside Minangkabau society, particularly in Aceh, through the river (Tempo Magazine, 2007). As already explained, the trade, especially coffee, is one of the main factors that would allow for the emergence of fundamentalist religiosity in Minangkabau; and at the same time, through such religiosity, Padri also trying to secure the coffee trade lane as their main economy.

Concretely, conflict and civil war as a result of Padri radicalism espoused by Taufik Abdullah is not solely rooted in the principles of religion, but also because of economic problems and political power (Robert E Lucius). In fact, sometimes the last two issues have become so prominent although they are always covered with religious symbols.

### **Track Record of Radical Islam until the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998:**

In a later development, dakwah movement of Islam based on *Amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* in the early 20th century, result two groups of people called the elderly and young people. From some of the literature review, young people are more colored by the Muhammadiyah movement, while the elderly are more colored by the Islamic movement who gathered in Nahdatul Ulama (Azra & Al Jauhari, 1996).

Next in the context of a larger movement centralized on the island of Java, in the early 20th century Dutch colonial political conditions have encouraged national consciousness born marked by the birth of a group of organizations that are social and, eventually developing into a political movement. Muslim community groups are also involved with the establishment of the United Islamic Trade (*Serikat Dagang Islam*) in Solo in 1911. In the political Islamic movements in the archipelago was also marked by the birth of political parties as a means of struggle for the independence of Indonesia (Kartodirdjo, 1987).

There are three forces community groups that play a role in the independence movement, fought based on religion, nationalism based on the struggle, and that struggle is based on communism. Struggle of religious-based group had spawned some Muslim political parties, such as the Islamic Party of Indonesia (PSII), the Union of Tarbiah (Perty), and Masjumi, and others. The third force this community succeeded in realizing independence from the Netherlands in 1945, but in the subsequent development of the communist-leaning group that unilateral movement by a coup in 1948, and the last of the communist coup in 1965 through September 30 PKI Movement. While the Islamic parties, Masjumi was dissolved before the outbreak of the G30S / KPI for allegedly sponsoring PRRI in Central Sumatra (Kahin, 2009). Masjumi was also been polemical because another parties suspected Masyumi influenced by Wahabi (Ricklefs, 2005).

Following the fall of the Sukarno regime and the beginning of the New Order regime under Soeharto's leadership, the remaining two social and political forces in the community life of the nation are a religious group and anationalism group with the mission of implementing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution purely and consistently. National groups represented by *Golongan Karya* (Golkar) tried to lead the political forces and Islamic organizations jointly ran is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The efforts of escorting to Pancasila as the sole principle by new order regime managed to set Pancasila as a struggles principle in political life in 1983 (Ricklefs, 2005).

Securing the Pancasila as the state and the only principle of struggle, the government started to act massively with the label "Command Jihad" to groups of people who did not accept Pancasila as the basis of political struggle. People who are not satisfied with the unification principle by the New Order regime, monitored and suspected as anti group to NKRI based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Keeping silence this group, the New Order government diverted the issue by making the command of jihad, as the radical Islamic movement. Komando Jihad is a potential political instrument of accession by Ali Murtopo to destroy Islamic political after the destruction of communism. According to (Busyro Muqoddas et al, 1992) struggle of Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo who dreamed an Islamic state in Indonesia actually has been completed in 1962. But, the group was revived by the intelligence in the form of "Komando Jihad" as part of a strategy to win Golkar and strengthening the powers of the new order.

Was the New Order government successful to keep silence this radical Islam or Komando Jihadin this

Republic? Actually not! the history proves after the collapse of the New Order in 1998, Islamic groups who have done hoist secretly since the 1980s began to move more freely. Four years after Suharto stepped down Rizieq proclaimed the founding of the Islamic Defenders Organization or *Fron Pembela Islam* (FPI) in Jakarta. As the Hisham views at 2010, in a study of anatomy of Salafi propaganda conflict in Indonesia explained that even though the new order to suppress Islamic groups of the structural aspects of politics, it does not mean the radical Islamic movement was halted its dak'wa. They are still struggling through the motions dak'wa, live clustered in a small exclusive community and preaching in a restricted environment, impressed quietly and in a way that almost be called a closed (Hasan, 2008). Those who named his group the Salafi Da'wa movement managed to establish a boarding school, where they teach and spread its religious ideology. After the collapse of the New Order, the Salafi Da'wa is very important change, dak'wa previously done secretly, now they do openly and even spectacularly founded the paramilitary movement, and they called Laskar Jihad. As it was stated by (Rubaidi, 2014) that the Laskar Jihad movement is one variant of the Islamic movement that existed during the reform era. Financing its movement, they established a foundation that usually use the word *sunnah* or words associated with it, like *Difa an al Sunnah*, *Ihya 'al Sunnah*, *Ihya' al Turath* and the like. In this reform era Salafi Da'wa is progressing very important.

### **Wahabi and Islamic Radicalism in Reform Era:**

Having elected a charismatic figure of Nadhatul Ulama Abdul Rahman Wahid as the President of the Republic of Indonesia through the proceedings of the MPR tough and compromising in 1999 with accompanied by Megawati as vice president, this was an important milestone as the process of transition from an era of autocratic to the reform era. Despite of relatively short reign of about two years, but the leadership Gusdur has brought a fundamental change to the people of Indonesia (Ricklefs, 2005).

Changes in the social life of the community mainly ethnic Chinese was no longer barriers to commemorate a wide variety of important days and display a wide variety of cultural art forms Bronsai that Suharto was strictly prohibited. The results showed that the Chinese community in various areas, such as Chinese ethnic who live in residential areas in the city of Padang cottage has been involved in art and culture featuring Baronsai the celebration of the independence of Indonesia on August 17, 1945. Then structurally politics through the 1945 amendment agreement, and parliament through electoral law has given freedom to the growth of political parties. There are 48 political parties involved in the reform era of the first elections in 1999. Moreover, the institution of Indonesian National Police (Polri), which during the New Order regime under the command of the Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI commander) is separated into a stand-alone institution headed by Chief of Indonesian National Police (Chief of Police) is equivalent to the Armed Forces Commander which was later renamed Commander of Army of the Republic of Indonesia (TNI Commander). And granting of authority from central to local government through the City and District Law No. 32 of 1999

On the other hand, according to the context of this research is the radical, fundamentalist, trans-national Islamic moving underground of Soeharto regime were popping up to the surface. Results of research (Eliraz, 2004); (Azra, 2006); (Delong-Bas, 2008); (Hasan, 2008); (Ahmad Fuad, 2013); (Galamas, 2015); (Afandi, 2016); (Hashim, 2016) also describes the beginning of the reform era is empirically characterized by the proliferation of radical social movements of Islam among young people has become an important record for the general public, students of history, academics, the media and policy makers. The results of this study indicate that there are five radical Islamic movements that exist and well-organized violence to make the change in the aspect of religious life, dak'wa, and social; Islamic Defenders Front, Laskar Jihad (LJ), Jamaah Islamiah (JI), Al Qaeda, and the Indonesian Mujahedeen Council (IMC). There is a civic organization (Ormasy) of Islam does not promote violence to do dak'wa but have a target of radical wanted modifiers philosophical basis of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), namely, the movement Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). The academics try to understand this phenomenon through theoretical and empirical approaches, the rise of radical social movements is an articulation of certain political groups' crunch rooted to dissatisfaction with the ruling regime of Soeharto authority in this country for 32 years.

Next the results of this study also reveal a radical social movement that spearheaded by young Islamic groups which were genealogically rooted in the early period of independence. For those young people of Islam, the phase of reform is an opportunity for the opening of political opportunity structures that is relatively under an authoritarian regime. As the approach to social theory put forward (Sydney Tarrow, 1998), the availability of the political opportunity structure became one of the important variables of social mobilization, one of which intangible Islamic movement. This view is also supported by (Martin van Bruinessen, 2002), that a number of radical Islamic movements were rampant in the reform era has historical roots in Masjumi and Darul Islam (DI) / TII. Besides the factor of political opportunity structure, also caused by the economic crisis conditions in



transition has spawned unemployment rate is quite high. As stated by (Noorhaidi Hassan, 2010) that another important factor to explain the rise of radical Islam in those days was the high level of unemployment among young people in Indonesia around 72.5% in 1997 came from the youth-only edged to number 70 % ten years later. However it is important to note that the rise of radical social movements of political Islam in the transition period was an accumulation of many factors, including, according (Hosen, 2002) the rise of the radical movement after the new order is more due to the repeal of the Anti-subversion by President BJ Habibie.

Islamic social movements which were rampant in the political transition were the beginning of the reform era at least can be grouped into three variants of Islamic social movements. According to (Hasan, 2002) there are variants of Islamic activism movement *jihadi* ; variant *pious / salafi*, and variants *politics*. *First* , the Islamic movement *jihadi* has characteristics justify the use of violence and terrorism to achieve political goals, namely to enforce Islamic governance structures. Those include among others: Jemaah Islamiyah and the various sub-variants of Darul Islam (DI), the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII), and so forth. The first variant includes the Islamic movement that dared to plunge into religious conflict communal in East Indonesia, such as Ambon and Poso. Personal from Islamic groups is widely seen crossroads in the towns of Sumatra and Java were asking for the public's helping hand volunteer/ social contribution that they use to conduct jihad in Ambon and Poso.

*Second* , Variants movement *pious / salafi* has focused on the characteristic dimensions of law by improving the morals of the people, the purity of faith and Islamic identity and are not so keen to achieve political power. They are included in this variant is the Wahabi-Salafi movement with various sub-variants such as the FPI. While the third variant, the Islamic movement *politics* has the characteristics involved in the political process, either directly or indirectly, as well as working within the framework of the constitution of the state.

The third variant, is already seen movement in the decade of the 80s through the campus and the defendants' motion member recruitment done by individuals and style clothes the women were different from the others with the characteristic width of the veil that covers the entire back. If the first and second variant (variant of *jihadi* and *salafi*) have a stand against politics and against democracy, activism *political* Islam actually been politically active. According to them, participate in the political process under a democratic system is legitimate and necessary, including strive towards Islamic law. Even the Islamic group of *variants* of this third became the main mentor in the House of Representatives to control people's behavior through enforcement Regional Regulation (Perda) immorality or any other name (Rubaidi, 2014).

Although ultimately, communal-religious conflict in Ambon and Poso has subsided and can be solved through socio-cultural approach in era of government packages Susilo Bambang Yoedoyono (SBY) and Jusuf Kalla, but there are no signs that the trend of radicalism also experienced low tide phase. Until this time, the Islamic variant of *jihadi*, still making a communal-religious conflict in Ambon and Poso as a means of mass mobilization and make the area (post) conflict as a base of the Islamic movement *jihadi*. They also continue to carry out acts of violence and terror in the outside areas of conflict, as seen in the action sequence Bali Bombing (2002) and Bali II (2005) as well as other terrorist acts ( Rithy, 2015 ). Equally with the *jihadist*, Islamic movements' *salafi* also take advantage of the momentum of the mobilization of jihad as an opportunity to expand and extend the area of influence. In the post-jihad, for example, they succeeded in making Ambon as the 'capital' of the Salafi movement in the eastern region of Indonesia (Jahroni, 2007). The same was done by Islamic activism *politics*, where political progress they expanded. Interestingly, while most of the votes of Islamic political parties has decreased since the 2004 elections, but the *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS), which is categorized as a variant of Islamic activism movement managed to boost her voice and become an Islamic political party with the largest vote totals (Machmudi, 2005).

#### **Wahabi and the Islamic Defenders Organization or *Fron Pembela Islam* (FPI):**

Islamic Defenders Organization or *Fron Pembela Islam* (FPI) is a hardliner Islamic organizations based in Jakarta and was founded by Mohammad Habib Rizieq Shihab bin Hussein, famous with Rizieq. FPI declared on August 17, 1998 (24 Rabiutsani 1419 H) on yard of Pondok Pesantren Al-Um Kampung Utan Ciputat, South Jakarta by a number Habib, Ulama, preachers, and Muslim activists who witnessed the hundreds of students who come from Jabodetabek (Van Bruinessen, 2002); (Saleh, 2013); (Rubaidi, 2014). The establishment of this organization just four months after President Soeharto resigned, because at the time president of the New Order government will not tolerate extremism in any form.

Rizieq claimed purpose of the FPI is for the establishment of the implementation of Islamic law in secular. The hardliner Islamic groups saw Muslims as the majority population have not received fair treatment from the ruling regime. The long-suffering Muslims of Indonesia in the form of human rights violations committed by powerful individuals as well as their bad and immorality are rampant in all sectors of life has become a major factor for them to enforce enjoining good and forbidding wrong for the sake of the dignity of Islam and Muslims.

Such Padri movement in Minangkabau, it also started by social conditions of Minangkabau when it did not carry out Islamic law in accordance guidance of the Qur'an and Hadith. Public behavior such as; drinking wine, risking chicken, gambling is getting out of control. The economic development is getting better with the emergence of coffee as an export commodity to make people live full eporia and deviated from Islamic law. These conditions have pushed Tuanku Nan Renceh to form a rival government under the name "the Eight Tiger Council" (*Dewan Harimau Nan Salapan*). It means that there are eight Ulama who play an important role in enforcing Islamic syariat through the Padri movement (Radjab, 1964); (Abdullah, 1966); (Mansoer, 1970); (A'la, 2008).

Then, the movement of FPI also has a strong attitude towards those who underestimate the Quran, the Islamic Shari'ah, or Islamic laws against those who want to undermine the faith of Muslims. Assertion is shown in the form of more radical action than other radical Islamic movements in the country. Based on the record Wahid Institute (WI) Jakarta, exclusiveness and radicalism of FPI have a variant manifest very diverse, ranging closure of places of worship to the use of violent means. From 2001 to 2006, FPI has done violence to the various places in Jakarta. On August 27, 2001 incorporated in the future of hundreds of FPI staged a rally at the House of Representatives or *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (DPR) and the People's Consultative Assembly or *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR).

They demanded the DPR and MPR to restore Pancasila according to the Charter of Jakarta. This demand was clearly revealed FPI wants to restore the role of Islamic groups in formulating the Jakarta Charter clearly states that the first base of Pancasila on God by running the Islamic Shari'a for its adherents. Then on October 9, 2001 FPI made a fuss in a demonstration in front of the US embassy to tear down barbed wire barricades and security forces fired tear gas and water cannons. Followed by October 15, 2001 Police of Metrojaya lowered about 1000 officers from four battalions in the police to surround the office of the FPI in Jalan Petamburan III West Jakarta and ended with clashes between the two groups. On March 15, 2002 Commander Lasykar FPI, Tubagus Muhammad Siddiq affirmed, sweeping action against places of entertainment which proved that sin is the right of society. On May 22, 2003 Field Coordinator of FPI, Tubagus Siddik, along with 10 members of Islamic Defenders Front paramilitary troops beat a man on the road toll. On 9 and July 15, 2005 Hundreds of people wearing FPI ront attributes led by Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf attacked Jamaah Ahmadiyah in Parung-Bogor, and forced to emptied the entire complex of buildings and forcing the police put a police line.

In 2006 there were four times the acts of violence by FPI, including on April 12, 2006 FPI attacked and damaged the office of Playboy magazine. May 20, 2006 Date of FPI raids at 11 locations assessed as immoral place in Kampung Kresak, Jatisampurno, Pondok Gede. Resumes on May 21, 2006. FPI seal Fahmina Institute office in Cirebon and dated May 23, 2006 FPI expel KH Abdurrahman Wahid from Interfaith Dialogue Forum in Purwakarta.

From a series of FPI above, it can be concluded that FPI action is directed to enforce enjoining good and forbidding wrong to make efforts to prevent and eradicate public behavior that is contrary to the doctrine of Islam. Enforcement actions Islamic requirement is done from year to year, especially during the holy month of Ramadan. Almost a kind of becomes a tradition, every Ramadan always appear FPI are packed with the slogan "anti-vice operation". Some forms of FPI in the month, among other things, forced the closure of entertainment venues, closing the diner that is open during the day, sweeping liquor raid Commercial Sex Workers (CSWs), and even beat people who did not fasting.

However, during the administration of President Joko Widodo, FPI went increasingly out of control. FPI will no longer focus on efforts to enforce Islamic law, but has begun to come into contact with the political sphere. Medium Jakarta governor election has become a political arena for the FPI to indicate the existence of the attitude of the FPI who does not feel unpleasant careful look lunge Jakarta Governor, Basuki Purnama Tjahaya, in building Jakarta. Governor that is likely to progress back in the second period is a threat to the existence of FPI.

Ahok negligence in a speech said during a working visit to the thousand islands has become a cornerstone of action to FPI to confront issues Ahok by throwing Ahok have done blasphemy, Surah Al Maidah, verse 51. FPI try to bring up the issue of defamation of religion Ahok into the realm of law, that the Governor patahana Basuki Purnama Tjahaya thrown in jail. This work is done by holding two rallies FPI stages. First phase carried out on 4 November 2016 and December 2, 2016. The second were able to bring a million people in Jakarta with the major issue of blasphemy by Jakarta Governor Basuki Cahaya Purnama or famously called Ahok.

The results showed whether both Padri movement and FPI are equally included into hardliner Islamic groups and try to resolve the problems of a society that does not fit to Al Qur'an and hadith radically. Both movements also have ties with the Wahabi ideology. As explained by (Azra, Jaringan ulama: Timur Tengah dan kepulauan

Nusantara abad XVII & XVIII: akar pembaruan Islam Indonesia, 2004); (Azra, 2005); (Azra, 2006) and (A'la, 2008), if Padri movement is the beginning of the return of three of the Minangkabau pilgrimage in Makah who at that time was going reform movement by Mohammad bin Abdul Wahab then FPI as a movement for standing Islamic Shari'a which is also strongly rooted with Wahabi. Although FPI organizational-structural is not explicitly stated part of the Wahhabi, but in terms of similarity orientation, ideology, and the target movement genealogically no kinship closely between the movement of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia with Wahabi (Hasan, 2008); (Damayanti, Thayibi, Gardhiani, & Limy, 2012); (Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, 2012); (Hilmy, 2014); (Hashim, 2016).

It also includes that FPI is also genealogically affinity meeting with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahabis. Ikhwan al-Muslimin as transnational movements which "operate" in Indonesia, in the decade of the 80s exist initially through institutions which later became the campus proselytizing movement of Tarbiyah Movement. The group then founded the Prosperous Justice Party or Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Hizbut-Tahrir (HT) with the idea of Pan-Islamism who wants to enforce Islamic Caliphate throughout the world, and put Indonesia as one part in it. According (Jamhari & Jahroni, 2004); (Hasan, 2002); (Mubarak, 2008); (Mubarak, 2015); (Mudzakkir, 2016) radical Islam contemporary is identified into five groups, the FPI, Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council or Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and the movement of the Islamic State of Indonesia (ISI).

If during the Padri movement, there was only one variant of the Islamic movement, then during the reform era, variants of the Islamic movement that was born with different demands. FPI for example, its activities more extensively leads to other forms of destruction against what they call places of vice. Laskar Jihad concentrate far more on a kind of military activity, which is doing the exercises of war and armed themselves with sharp weapons. Following up, in the realm of politics, efforts to revive the demands of the past, the formalization of Islamic Shari'a as positive law, though not to make Islam the basis of the state, has voiced again by Islamic political parties, for example, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) and the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). As a little touched on above, that the fall of the New Order empirically a blessing for the Islamic group. How not, throughout the history of the reign of the new order (Order), Islamic groups (especially in the political sphere) as if nothing ever find "comfort" of its existence, and even tend to suspect and neutered. (Mohtar Mas'ood, 1989) says that the paradigm of New Order era was oriented to modernization and economic development (economic as commander) with suspicion seeing Muslim political forces, mainly Islamic parties as a stumbling block which at any time can become a time bomb for the programs of New Order development.

Substantially, the idea of the movement promoted by the Islamic movement (read: radical Islam) remain the same, namely the issues that the threads of the spirit of Puritanism and boiled down to "Islamic law". The final aim of all ideas of this movement is nothing but the "Islamic State" or various forms of derivatives, such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Hasan al-Banna), the Jama'at-i Islami of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Hizb an-Nabhani Taqiyuddin premises), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Laskar Jihad (LJ), and the FPI. Some of the organizations mentioned above are some of the parent of a growing organization since its inception. It is still not calling or fractional part of the parent organization above. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwanul Muslimin*) was fragmented into pieces while in Indonesia. Tarbiyah and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) is an ideology based on the doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood (MI). Tarbiyah question here is none other than the birth of Islamic Organizations Justice Party (PK) which finally changed again to the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS).

## CONCLUSION:

Interaction between Wahabi thinking with the Indonesian people began to look at the 19th century in Minangkabau through the returning of three leaders from Makah. Wahabism considered inspired the West Sumatran origin known as the next wave of the Padri led by Tuanku Imam Bonjol. Next the 20th century the influence of Wahhabi thought massively entered Indonesia through the role of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, founded by Muhammad Natsir. Through the financial support of Saudi Arabia, the agency sends many students to the Middle East to study Islam (Jahroni, 2007); (Muzakki, 2014).

Padri movement in Minangkabau in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and radical Islamic movements in Indonesia through the FPI have a leader who comes from Arab migrants. If the Padri movement led by Peto Syarif, Tuanku Imam Bonjol, who is Morocco's Arab migrants then FPI is also led by Arab migrants of Yemen. Starting from the religious movement to purify the implementation of Islamic law and led to a political movement that wants to position the doctrine of Islam as a way of life high above the country's constitution.

From the point of view of a country that is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the Wahhabi movement is considered potentially damaging the religiosity of Muslims in Indonesia. The process of Islamization in Indonesia with fixed keeping religious traditions considered heretical and deviant by Wahabi environment. The doctrines of the Wahhabi circles in the form of actions carried out by the radical FPI. The government period of Widodo- Jusuf Kalla was showing increasingly radical shown through the action of 4 November 2016 and December 2, 2016. Behind the public morals repair mission, FPI is also veiled conflict stuck in Jakarta Governor election arena that representative interests channeled through partner FPI candidate for Governor Anis Baswedan - Uno. Countries have undertaken massive approach towards the radical Islamic movement that has a network of trans-national Islamic movement, but the presence of a radical Islamic ormas required a special approach. Keep in handling the door of pesantren education institutions in aspects of the curriculum in order to make that schools of educational institutions do not become fortress of Wahabi in Indonesia.

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